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C hapter 10 of The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations! is concerned with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. While 
the extent that the use of these weapons, other than nuclear, will impinge 
on naval warfare (except in connection with naval surface and naval air 
bombardment ofland objectives, riverine operations, etc.) is probably fairly 
limited, the draftsmen of the Handbook have deemed it appropriate to include 
a full chapter on these subjects - and rightly so. In addition to discussing the 
evolution and present status of the applicable rules of the international law 
of war with respect to each of those categories of weapons, this commentary 
will discuss the extent to which those rules affect naval warfare qua naval 
warfare and the extent to which they affect the operations of naval units 
against objectives on land. 
Nuclear Weapons 
When the first atom bomb exploded over Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, it 
began a new (and perilous) era for the planet Earth. It also began a controversy 
which has yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of a great many people. 
Not unexpectedly, sometime after the facts with respect to the nature of 
the atom bomb and the extent of the casualties and damage inflicted at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki became generally known, an issue was raised as to 
the legality or illegality of the use of the atom bomb - and, subsequently, 
the same issue was, of course, raised as to the use of its far more powerful 
and devastating successors. In the discussion which follows it must be borne 
in mind that while there are a number of conventions placing various types 
of restrictions on nuclear weapons,2 there is no convention which specifically 
outlaws their use.3 In light of the complete failure of all of the practically 
endless efforts undertaken since 1945 to accomplish this result, to argue that 
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the use of such weapons is prohibited by inference derived from the provisions 
of international agreements dating from 1868, from 1899, or from 1907, 
appears to be the equivalent of tilting at windmills. In view of the foregoing 
this writer concurs with the statement contained in the Handbook to the effect 
that, "There are no rules of customary or conventional international law 
prohibiting nations from employing nuclear weapons in armed conflict."4 
Nevertheless, a brief analysis of the arguments pro and con appears to be 
warranted. 
The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, 
of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes WeightS contained a number 
of humanitarian preambular clauses: 
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during 
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; 
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; 
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly 
aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; 
That the employment of such arms would, therefore be contrary to the laws of 
humanity. 
During the course of the drafting of what became the 1899 Hague Convention 
(II) With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land6 and its annexed 
Regulations, several provisions were included which have often been cited as 
affecting the subject under discussion. These provisions were: 
Art. 22. The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy are not 
unlimited. 
Art. 23. In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially 
forbidden: 
(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons; ... 
(e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous 
injury; ... 
The cognate provisions of the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the 
Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annexed Regulations are essentially 
identical with those quoted above.7 
Realizing, however, that these and the other provisions that were to be 
included in the Regulations could not possibly cover all of the contingencies 
that might arise during the course of a war, the Russian representative at 
the 1899 Peace Conference, Martens, a noted international lawyer, proposed, 
and the Conference agreed, that a paragraph be included in the preamble 
which would read: 
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Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting Parties 
think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, 
populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles 
of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, 
from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the public conscience.8 
Assuming that ~ese preambular provisions are law-making in nature, a 
number of questions arise. Did the use of the atomic bombs in 1945 weaken 
the military forces of the enemy? Did it uselessly aggravate the sufferings 
of disabled men, or render their death inevitable? Did it exceed the limits 
which a belligerent may adopt as a means of injuring the enemy? Did it 
constitute the use of "poison"? Did it represent the employment of a weapon 
"calculated to cause unnecessary suffering"? Did it constitute a failure to give 
the populations and belligerents "the protection and empire of the principles 
of international law, as they result from the usages established between 
civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the 
public conscience" to which they were entitled? And, most important, if one 
or more of these questions is answered in the 'affirmative, does the particular 
principle apply if the alternative would have resulted in a million American 
military casualties and an even greater number of Japanese casualties, military 
and civilian? In other words, was the principle of proportionality applicable?9 
While all of those questions have been posed here with respect to Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, they will likewise have to be asked - and answered - before 
any future use of nuclear weapons. 
Literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on both sides 
of the questions posed and it is doubtful that any proponent of either side 
of the argument has been successful in convincing anyone who disagrees with 
his position that it is correct and that the other person's position is incorrect. 
The present writer does not propose to draw himself into that quagmire. 
Suffice it to say that nuclear weapons are with us and at the present time 
there does not appear to be any possibility that they will disappear, at least 
in the foreseeable future. Under those circumstances we can only hope that 
neither side will make the mistake of using them and thus bring an end to 
civilization, and to life itself, on this planet. 
There is, of course, an area of nuclear warfare in which navies would play 
an important role. A preemptive first strike by one side might possibly 
eliminate much of the other side's land-based nuclear deterrent force - but 
it could not reach the deployed naval-based force, the submarines of which 
are the ever-mobile carriers of nuclear ballistic missiles. Thus, this potential 
naval retaliatory force, maintained by both parties involved in the eyeball-
to-eyeball confrontation which has more or less existed since shortly after 
the end of W orId War II, is a major factor in the policy of deterrence. 
Moreover, the strength and speed of these nuclear-powered and nuclear-
armed submarines are reputedly such that there are experts who believe that 
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they can only be destroyed by nuclear weapons, such as nuclear-armed depth 
charges or nuclear-armed torpedoes. If such is the tase, the use of these latter 
nuclear weapons becomes almost inevitable as during a period of active 
hostilities, whether we call it war or armed conflict, no nation and no navy 
is going to permit enemy nuclear-powered submarines armed with nuclear 
ballistic missiles to roam the seas unchallenged. 
One problem which arises is whether successful conventional-weapons 
attacks on nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed submarines (and surface 
vessels) would ad~ersely affect the waters of the oceans and the air of the 
atmosphere. While the United States has lost two nuclear submarines with 
no such adverse effects, this is far from conclusive as the two crews would 
probably have shut down the nuclear reactors and any nuclear weapons aboard 
the submarines would not have been armed; accordingly, the amount of 
radioactivity released by each of those vessels would have been minimal. How 
much environmental damage would be caused by the sinking of a nuclear-
armed and nuclear-powered submarine with its reactor in operation appears 
to be a relative unknown. Moreover, should a war reach the nuclear stage, 
it is a virtual certainty that any naval engagement would include the use of 
nuclear weapons against the opposing enemy fleets. When this occurs the 
extent of the contamination of the oceans and of the atmosphere is incalculable 
as nuclear explosions would be taking place both in the atmosphere and in 
the water and nuclear-powered ships would be sunk with their reactors in 
operation.tO Of course, should a war reach the nuclear stage, such matters 
would be a small, and comparatively unimportant, part of the overall picture. 
The ballistic missiles carried by nuclear-powered submarines, referred to 
above, would, of course, if used, be directed against objectives on land. It 
is doubtful, but not inconceivable, that in a nuclear war a naval bombardment 
of objectives on land might include nuclear-armed shells and missiles. 
However, should a war reach that stage, the results of any such bombardment 
would be miniscule compared to the results that could be expected from land-
based nuclear ballistic missiles, from the nuclear ballistic missiles released 
from below the surface of the seas, and from the nuclear weapons dropped 
from the air. 
It is probably necessary to conclude that if and when an armed conflict 
approaches the nuclear stage, law will playa very small role in determining 
the actions of the belligerents. 
Chemical Weapons 
Chemical warfare agents have been defined as "chemical substances, 
whether gaseous, liquid, or solid, which might be employed because of their 
direct toxic effects on man, animals and plants. "11 
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The earliest formal international attempt to prohibit the use of chemicals 
in warfare occurred at the 1899 Hague Peace Conference which drafted and 
adopted a Declaration stating, "The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from 
the use of projectiles the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating 
or deleterious gases. "12 This Declaration was of unlimited duration. All of 
the major European Powers, including France, Germany, Russia, and the 
United Kingdom, signed and ratified it. The United States neither signed nor 
ratified it. 
The 1899 Declaration was in force during World War I. Despite this, 
Germany used gas against the Russians in Poland in January 1915. The gas 
was delivered by artillery shells but, because of the sub-zero weather, had 
little effect and the incident passed almost unnoticed.13 The first major, and 
well-documented, use of gas occurred in France, on April 22, 1915, when the 
Germans opened containers of compressed chlorine, permitting a favoring 
wind to blow the gas towards the Allied Ypres salient.14 The success of the 
operation far exceeded expectations15 and before the war was brought to an 
end more than three years later many other chemical weapons were being 
used by both sides and were being delivered by artillery, mortars, projectors, 
etc.16 The Treaty of Versailles, which legally terminated World War I as 
between Germany and the Allies, contained the following provision: 
Article 171 
The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials 
or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden 
in Germany. 
The same applies to materials specially intended for the 'manufacture, storage and 
use of the said products or devices.17 
The 1922 Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, 
consisting of representatives of France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, drafted a treaty which was primarily concerned with 
submarine warfare but which included the following provisions: 
Art. 5. The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous 
liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of 
the civilized world and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to 
which a majority of the civilized Powers are parties, 
The signatory Powers, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted 
as a part ofintemationallaw binding alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare 
their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves and 
invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto. IS 
To become effective this treaty required the ratification of all of the 
participants in the Conference. France refused to ratify it because of 
objections to some of the provisions with respect to submarine warfare. 
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Accordingly, the treaty never entered into force. However, three years later 
another conference, this one concerned with international trade in weapons 
and ammunition, drafted the 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the 
Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological 
Methods ofWarfare.19 While much ofits wording was taken almost verbatim 
from the prior draftings, its importance warrants the setting forth of its 
operative provisions in their entirety: 
Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous 
liquids, materials or devices, has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the 
civilized world; and 
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in Treaties to which the 
majority of Powers of the world are Parties; and 
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part ofInternational 
Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations; 
Declare: 
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties 
prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the 
use of bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves 
according to the terms of this declaration. 
Strange to relate, while the United States had ratified the Washington Treaty, 
with its provision prohibiting the use of poisonous gases, just two years earlier, 
and was the chief proponent of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, it did not ratify 
the latter until 50 years later, in 1975! 
Many of the states which have ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol have 
done so with a so-called "first use" reservation. Typical of those reservations 
is that of the United Kingdom: "The said Protocol shall cease to be binding 
on His Britannic Majesty toward any Power at enmity with him whose armed 
forces, or the armed forces of whose allies, fail to respect the prohibitions 
laid down in the Protocol."2O It does not appear that this "first use" 
reservation has ever been invoked despite the not-infrequent use of the 
prohibited gases. For example, Italy, a party to the Protocol (as was 
Ethiopia), admittedly used poison gas in its 1935-1936 war with Ethiopia. 
Japan, although a party to the 1899 Declaration, did not ratify the Protocol 
until after World War II. On June 5,1942, President Roosevelt warned the 
Japanese against the use of poisonou~ gas.21 While at that time Japan denied 
using such gas in China,22 it has never officially denied such use since the 
end of the war. Egypt, a Party to the 1925 Protocol (as was the Yemen Arab 
Republic.), is alleged to have used gas in the civil war in Yemen. Iraq, also 
a party to the Protocol (as is Iran), has been accused of using gas in its recent 
war with Iran.23 In none of these cases is there evidence of retaliation in 
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kind, probably because the victim of the gas attack was not in possession 
of a stock of chemical weapons. 
During World War II Hitler on occasion considered ~he use of chemical 
weapons against England. However, he apparently realized, or his military 
advisers were able to convince him, that Germany's opponents were well able 
to reply in kind and that, in the long run, the use of such weapons would 
be self-defeating to Germany.24 OnJune 5,1943, President Roosevelt warned 
Germany that the use of chemical weapons by any Axis country against any 
one of the United Nations would result in "swift retaliation in kind," 
specifying that the targets would be "munition centers, seaports, and other 
military objectives throughout the whole extent of the territory of such Axis 
country."25 With the possible exception of Japanese use in China, chemical 
weapons were not used by any belligerent during World War II.26 
The General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted a number of 
resolutions on the subject of chemical warfare.27 A resolution adopted in 1968, 
among other things, requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the 
assistance of experts, a report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) 
weapons.28 This report, which was submitted to the General Assembly in 1969, 
found that "because of the scale and intensity of the potential effects of their 
use, they are considered as weapons of mass destruction."29 The report 
contained the following statement: 
The general conclusion of the report can thus be summed up in a few lines. Were 
these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring 
the effects would be, and how they would affect the structure of society and the 
environment in which we live.30 
Upon the receipt of that report the General Assembly adopted a resolution 
to the effect that the 1925 Geneva Protocol "embodies the generally 
recognized rules of international law prohibiting the use in international 
armed conflict of all biological and chemical methods of warfare. "31 Of 
course, this merely represented the political judgment of those. nations which 
voted in favor of the resolution. 
The need to maintain a supply of chemical weapons for use in retaliation 
against a violator of the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, or any other 
"first user," has created the longtime problem of finding a safe method for 
the disposition of overage gas, with leaky containers adding to the difficulties 
of the possessor. One technical advance in this field, the so-called "binary" 
gases, will considerably alleviate this problem. These gases consist of two 
non-toxic chemicals which only become toxic when mixed, an action which 
is accomplished while, for example, an artillery shell is in flight. A 
representative of the Chemical Corps of the United States Army listed the 
advantages of binary weapons as including "improved safety during 
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production, transportation and storage; no requirement for high-cost toxic 
production facilities; and simplified low-cost demilitarization procedures. "32 
A number of problems have arisen with respect to the interpretation of 
the 1925 Geneva Protocol. One such problem is whether it includes within 
its prohibitions the use of smoke, sometimes a major weapon in naval warfare, 
and the use of riot control agents, such as lachrymatories, or tear gas. The 
argument against the use of smoke, that it at least temporarily incapacitates 
due to a type of asphyxia, is weak and is not very frequently advanced. 
Originally the British interpreted the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
as covering lachrymatories.33 However, deeming it an essential weapon for 
use in Northern Ireland, in 1970 the British Government took the position 
that "cs and other such gases" were not prohibited by the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol.34 Practically all governments use lachrymatories domestically for 
the suppression of such events as riots and other civil disturbances. 
Nevertheless, the propriety of their use in armed conflict remains a matter 
of dispute. 
A further problem of interpretation is whether the Protocol includes within 
its prohibitions the use of herbicides. This problem arose during World War 
II when the question was raised as to whether it would be in accordance with 
international law to use "crop-destroying chemicals" on the gardens being 
grown by Japanese units located on by-passed islands of the Pacific. Although 
the Judge Advocate General of the Army found no legal impediment to such 
action,35 no action was taken, probably because it would have been a waste 
of resources. During the hostilities in Vietnam herbicides were used 
extensively, both for crop destruction and as a defoliant.36 When the issue 
was raised in the Senate during the consideration by that body of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense arrived 
at the same conclusion the Army had reached in 1945.37 Nevertheless, as will 
be noted below, the United States has renounced the first use of herbicides 
except for certain extremely limited purposes.38 
Another such problem of interpretation is whether incendiary weapons are 
within the prohibitions of the Protocol. The United States has long taken 
the position that there is no rule of international law prohibiting the use of 
incendiary weapons.39 At a conference of experts convened in 1969 by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, some of the experts were of the 
opinion that the use of incendiary weapons, and particularly napalm, was 
prohibited by the 1925 Geneva Protocol because, by burning the oxygen, it 
"causes a sort of asphyxia. " Others took the position that incendiary weapons 
were not prohibited but were subject to "discriminating" use. The ICRC 
concluded that "more extensive studies should be made of the consequences 
of incendiary weapons in order to reach a clear legal solution as to their 
employment. "40 The U.N. Report with respect to chemical and 
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bacteriological (biological) weapons, published that same year, contains the 
following relevant statement: 
We also recognize that there is a dividing line between chemical agents of warfare, 
in the sense in which we use the terms, and incendiary substances, such as napalm and 
smoke, which exercise their effects through fire, temporary deprivation of air or reduced 
visibility. We regard the latter as weapons which are better classified with high 
explosives than with the substances with which we are concerned. They are therefore 
not dealt with further in this report.41 
Studies were subsequently made by a group of experts appointed by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, by the Stockholm Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI), and by the ICRC itself in 1973, in 1974, and in 1976; and 
probably by other organizations and institutions. The U.N. experts found it 
appropriate "to bring to the attention of the General Assembly the necessity 
of working out measures for the prohibition of the use, production, 
development and stockpiling of napalm and other incendiary weapons"42-
a clear indication of their understanding that there was no such prohibition 
then extant. The author of the SIPRI report stated that "there was never 
any positive indication that the intention of the [1925] Geneva Protocol was 
to prohibit incendiaries. "43 The ICRC studies were inconclusive.44 Finally, 
the subject was discussed by the Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons 
of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of 
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts45 and the 
Diplomatic Conference adopted a resolution in which it recommended the 
convening of a conference to draft agreements on certain conventional 
weapons.46 Such a conference was held in 1980 and resulted in, among others, 
a Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use ofIncendiary Weapons.47 
. This Protocol does not prohibit the use of incendiaries; it merely places certain 
restrictions on the manner in which they may be used. The sum total to be 
derived from the foregoing survey is, of course, that incendiary weapons do 
not come within the purview of the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
or, for that matter, of any other international agreement on the law of war. 
The 1980 Protocol provides that it is prohibited "to make the civilian 
population, individual civilians or civilian objects the object of attack by 
incendiary weapons." (Of course, the law of war generally prohibits such 
attacks by any weapon!) Such a prohibition, and the accompanying restrictions 
on the use of air-delivered and other types of incendiary weapons intended 
to implement that prohibition, would obviously have no effect on naval 
engagements at sea. However, they would be applicable with respect to naval 
bombardments of land targets, either by warships or by aircraft, and with 
respect to the use of incendiaries by marines ashore. 
Now le~ us see where the United States stands generally on the question 
of chemical warfare. It has already been mentioned that the United States 
did not ratify the 1899 Declaration and that the 1925 Geneva Protocol was 
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not ratified by it until 1975. During that 50-year interim period the position 
of the United States with respect to chemical warfare was well summed up 
in the predecessor to the Handbook, which contained the following statement: 
The United States is not a party to any treaty now in force that prohibits or restricts 
the use in warfare of poisonous or asphyxiating gases or of bacteriological weapons. 
Although the use of such weapons frequently has been condemned by states, including 
the United States, it remains doubtful that, in the absence of a specific restriction established by 
treaty a state legally is prohibited at present from resorting to their use. However, it is clear that 
the use of poisonous gas or bacteriological weapons may be considered justified against 
an enemy who first resorts to the use of these weapons. [Footnotes omitted]48 
The United States has almost uniformly taken the position that there is no 
customary law prohibiting the use of these weapons.49 During the hostilities 
in Vietnam the United States used two controversial types of chemical 
weapons - tear gas and herbicides.50 Tear gas was originally used for 
humanitarian purposes51 but its utility as a non-lethal gas quickly became 
apparent and it was widely used for a number of purposes.52 This created 
considerable discussion both in the United States and elsewhere in the world 
with the result that on November 25, 1969, President Nixon issued a statement 
in which he said that he was resubmitting the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the 
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification and that the United States 
"Reaffirms its oft-repeated renunciation of the first use of lethal chemical 
weapons" and "Extends this renunciation to the first use of incapacitating 
chemicals. "53 
After extensive hearings and further commitments by the Executive 
Branch, the Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of the 1925 
Geneva Protocol54 and President Ford ratified it on January 22, 1975. The 
ratification was deposited, and the Protocol became binding on the United 
States, on April 10, 1975. On April 8, 1975, President Ford signed Executive 
Order 11,850 which provides: 
The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of herbicides 
in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of 
vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive 
perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes 
to save lives such as: 
( a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct 
U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war. 
(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or 
screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided. 
(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed 
aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners. 
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(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate 
combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary 
organizations.55 
Fortunately, since the issuance of that Executive Order, the United States 
has not been involved in any armed conflict which would make its application 
appropriate. However, the Handbook, issued in 1987, further illuminates the 
United States position with respect to the use of chemical weapons. It will 
be recalled that its predecessor, The Law of Naval Warfare, stated that it would 
be difficult to hold that use of such weapons was prohibited by customary 
internationallaw.56 In a complete turnabout, the Handbook says: 
The United States considers the prohibition against first use of lethal and 
incapacitating chemical weapons to be part of customary international law and, 
therefore, binding on all nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Gas 
Protocol.57 
It will be interesting to record the reactions to this position of states which 
are still not parties to the 1925 Protocol and which have not committed 
themselves in the General Assembly of the United Nations.58 
As we shall see, there is in existence a Convention which supplements the 
1925 Geneva Protocol by prohibiting the development, production, and 
stockpiling of biological agents and their delivery weapons.59 Although 
separate proposals made in 1962 by both the Soviet Union and the United 
States included similar provisions with respect to chemical weapons,60 both 
the United Kingdom and the United States later insisted on separating 
chemical weapons from the others. As a result, despite fairly continuous 
efforts, the only restriction on chemical weapons at the present time is the 
1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits use only. 
In 1984 then Vice President Bush went to Geneva to attend a meeting of 
the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and to table a United States proposal 
which sought to accomplish for chemical weapons what had already been 
accomplished for biological weapons.61 It has since been under consideration 
in the CD, which subsequently drafted and studied a 1987 revision.62 In January 
1989 a conference hosted by the French Government in Paris adopted a 
resolution calling for reaffirmation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and stressed 
"the necessity of concluding, at an early date, a convention on the prohibition 
of the development, production, stockpiling and use of all chemical weapons 
and on their destructipn."63 In July 1989 the United States and the Soviet Union 
reached agreement on the key remaining issues64 and currently (December 
1989) the CD is working on a May 1989 version65 with changes made up to 
15 October 1989.66 In view of the insistence of the United States on 
"anywhere-anytime" inspections, it is of interest to know that the Soviet 
Union has agreed to permit "surprise inspections" and that it is now the 
United States which has a problem in this respect in view of the Fourth 
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Amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting "unreasonable searches and 
seizures. "67 
The wheels of diplomacy grind slowly (witness the years of discussion of 
the 1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention and of the 1977 Protocols68), so 
there is still the possibility that in the not-too-distant future there will be 
agreement on a Convention which will prohibit the development, production, 
and stockpiling of chemical agents and their delivery systems, as well as 
providing for the destruction of all such chemical agents now in the arsenals 
of parties to such a Convention.69 
Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons 
Bacteriological (biological)70 weapons have been defined as "living 
organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them, 
which are intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants, and 
which depend for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal 
or plant attacked."71 International restrictions on the use of biological 
weapons present far fewer legal problems than do those on the use of chemical 
weapons. In fact, the legal situation is so clear that the major problem is, 
once again, that of ensuring compliance. 
It will be recalled that by the declaration contained in the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol the Parties agreed "to extend the prohibition [against the use of 
poisonous gas] to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare. ''72 The League 
of Nations Disarmament Conference discussed the matter and attempted, 
albeit unsuccessfully, to draft a treaty which would have prohibited the 
production and stockpiling of both chemical and biological weapons. During 
World War II considerable scientific research was done on biological 
weapons. However, no such weapons were used by either side, with one 
possible exception. The Soviet Union has long contended that during World 
War II the Japanese had a unit called "Bacteriological Detachment 731" 
located at Harbin in China and that this unit had conducted bacteriological 
experiments on several thousand Chinese, Koreans, Russians, and, perhaps, 
Americans. When the war ended, many of the senior officers of this unit were 
taken into Soviet custody and in December 1949 twelve of them were tried 
by a Soviet court at Khabarovsk, were found guilty of engaging in 
bacteriological warfare, and received sentences of confinement in a labor 
correction camp for terms varying from two to twenty-five years.73 In 1982 
the Japanese Government acknowledged that such a unit had existed during 
the war.74 Assuming that the Soviet charges are correct, it would appear that 
the activities of the Japanese unit never passed the experimental stage, that 
it never reached the stage of actual use of biologicals against enemy military 
forces as a weapon of war. 
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In 1962 the Soviet Union tabled at the meeting of the Eighteen Nation 
Disarmament Committee (ENDC) a proposal for general and complete 
disarmament which included the following provision: "The prohibition, and 
destruction of all stockpiles, and the cessation of the production of all kinds 
of weapons of mass destruction, including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, 
biological and radiological weapons. ''75 
A few weeks later the United States submitted its counterproposal with 
a provision which called for "Elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, 
chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and 
cessation of the production of such weapons. ''76 
In view of the close similarity of the two proposals, it would seem that 
agreement with respect at least to chemical and biological weapons could 
have been quickly attained.77 However, such was not the case. There were 
those who took the position that chemical and biological weapons should not 
be joined in the same treaty as there was experience with chemical weapons, 
but none with biologicals. While the relevance of this argument is far from 
clear, it was sufficient to delay the affirmative action which might otherwise 
have been taken. Finally, in 1969 the United Kingdom submitted a proposal 
which called for a complete ban on "microbial or other biological agents," 
but made no mention of chemical weapons.7S When, in 1971, the United States 
and the Soviet Union tabled identical drafts79 relating to biologicals only, the 
result was a foregone conclusion. Using that draft as a working document 
the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD, which had 
replaced ENDC) produced a Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and 
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.so Its most important provision 
states: 
Article 1 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, 
produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire or retain: 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method 
of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, 
protective or other peaceful purposes; 
(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins 
for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. 
It also contains provisions requiring each State Party to destroy all of the 
items specified in Article 1 within nine months of the Convention coming 
into force (presumably, for the State concerned); and an undertaking not to 
transfer to any recipient, or to encourage the manufacture of, any of the 
prohibited items. 
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It is thus evident that States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to 
the 1972 Bacteriological Convention are prohibited from developing, 
manufacturing, stockpiling, acquiring, retaining, or using biological weapons. In view 
of the coverage of the Convention, nations have not made "first use" 
reservations. The two international agreements were intended to, and should, 
eliminate biologicals from the arsenals of all such Parties and should mean 
that in any future war, large or small, limited or unlimited, conventional or 
unconventional, biologicals would not be a factor. Unfortunately, events have 
already demonstrated that these expectations will not be met. 
A catastrophe occurred in Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union in 1980 in which 
more than 1,000 people died as a result of what appears to have been anthrax 
poisoning, although Soviet officials claimed that the deaths had been caused 
by meat contaminated by hoof-and-mouth disease.sl In addition, the United 
States has contended that the Soviet Union, either directly or through 
surrogates, has used biological (as well as chemical) weapons in Southeast 
Asia and in Afghanistan.82 If, as is generally believed, the Sverdlovsk incident 
involved anthrax, and if, as the United States contends, biologicals have been 
used by the Vietnamese in Kampuchea and Laos and by the Soviet Union 
in Afghanistan, then the Soviet Union is manufacturing and using biologicals, 
contrary to the provisions of the two agreements to which it is a party. 
Unfortunately, the 1925 Geneva Protocol contains no provision for 
verification and the only provision for verification contained in the 1972 
Convention is a meaningless one providing for resort to the Security Council. 
The predecessor to the Handbook, published at a time when the United States 
was not a party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and when the 1972 Bacteriological 
Convention had not yet been drafted, stated: 
The United States is not a party to any treaty now in force that prohibits or restricts 
the use in warfare ... of bacteriological weapons. Although the use of such weapons 
frequently has been condemned by states, including the United States, it remains doubtful 
that, in the absence of a specific restriction established by treaty, a state legally is 
prohibited at present from resorting to their use. [Footnotes omitted.]83 
This was probably a fair statement of the United States position until 
November 25, 1969, when President Nixon, on behalf of the United States, 
renounced the use of biological weapons by this country.54 Three months later 
he included toxins in this renunciation. S5 Then this country became a party 
to the 1972 Bacteriological Convention and in 1975 it finally ratified the 1925 
Geneva Protocol with its ban on the use of biologicals. Once again, however, 
it appears that the Handbook may be going too far when it asserts: 
The United States considers the prohibition against the use of biological weapons 
during armed conflict to be part of customary intemationallaw and thereby binding 
on all nations whether or not they are parties to the 1925 Gas Protocol or the 1972 
Biological Weapons Convention.86 
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Can it be that while at a particular point in time a principle may not 
necessarily be a binding rule of customary international law, it becomes such 
as soon as the United States ratifies a treaty containing that principle? 
Certainly, the United States did not consider itself bound by any rule of 
customary international law prohibiting the use of biologicals when it issued 
its military manuals in 1955 and 1956; nor did it consider itself so bound at 
any time thereafter, even when (and until) President Nixon made his 1969 
and 1970 statements unilaterally renouncing the use of biologicals and toxins. 
Would the 50 or more nations which are not parties to the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol and the 50 or more nations which are not parties to the 1972 
Bacteriological Convention agree with the quoted statement? Or is this 
statement, and the similar one with respect to chemical weapons quoted 
above, inserted in order to convince non-parties that they might just as well 
ratify the agreements as they are bound by them in any event? 
In view of the mobility of naval forces, it has always been considered 
unlikely, but not impossible, that naval vessels at sea will have to meet the 
problem of defending themselves against an attack using biological (or 
chemical) weapons. Should such an attack occur, for example by guided 
missiles which succeed in penetrating the vessel's defenses and dispense the 
lethal item, the attack would have a devastating effect because air-intake 
systems would quickly disseminate it throughout the interior of the vessel, 
or because concurrent high-explosive ordnance would have pierced the shell 
of the ship. Items such as masks, special clothing, etc., available for the 
protection of the individual members of the crew, would greatly impede the 
functioning of the crew, even if there was time to don them. In addition, 
naval vessels, naval guns and naval aircraft might well be among the weapons 
systems used for the delivery of biologicals against land targets, should 
biologicals ever be used in wartime. Thus, in a field trial, a ship sailing 16 
kilometers offshore travelled a distance of 260 kilometers parallel to the 
coastline discharging a harmless powder. The resulting aerosol covered an 
area of over 75,000 square kilometers. Had the material disseminated been 
a biological "depending on the organism and its degree of hardiness, areas 
from 5,000 to 20,000 square kilometers could have been effectively attacked, 
infecting a high proportion of unprotected people in the area. "87 
Conclusions 
There is no law in force, conventional or customary, which prohibits the 
use of nuclear weapons. However, there can be no winners, but only losers, 
no victors, but only vanquished, in the event of a nuclear war. Whether or 
not a war in which nuclear powers are involved becomes a nuclear war will 
depend upon the wisdom and leadership of the political leaders of those powers 
and upon the extent to which the desire to win the war outweighs a reluctance 
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to bring disaster not only upon the enemy, but also upon their own people 
and upon the peoples of neutral nations. 
Chemical and biological weapons, like nuclear weapons, are weapons of 
mass destruction. Once released 'they are beyond the control of the user and, 
like nuclear weapons, their effects can come back to haunt the user. The use 
of certain chemicals can have widespread, long-lasting, and severe 
consequences for the environment and for the populations. This is even more 
true with respect to the use of many biologicals. The use of either of these 
types of weapons is prohibited by an international agreement to which more 
than two-thirds of the nations of the world community are parties. The very 
existence of biological weapons is prohibited by an international agreement 
with a similar amount of participation. Hopefully, there will, in due course, 
be an identical prohibition with respect to chemical weapons. 
In view of the tremendous lethal and destructive capabilities of nuclear, 
chemical, and biological weapons one might almost regret our inability to 
tum the clock back to the nineteenth century, when nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons, as we now know them, were not even a gleam in a 
scientist's eyes. 
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